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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
BANKRUPTCY AS BAILOUT 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai* & Stephen J. Lubben** 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of Chapter 11 to reorganize General Motors (GM) and Chrysler 
was undeniably high profile and has led to significant debate, discussion, 
and criticism from bankruptcy scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. In 
fact, almost every leading American corporate bankruptcy academic has 
spoken against these automotive bankruptcy cases.1 The most common 
critique has been the all-encompassing accusation that the Chrysler and GM 
cases undermined the entire Chapter 11 process, as well as the rule of law, 
in a way that will cause repercussions for debt markets for years to come.2 
In this Article, using a comparative approach (Canadian versus 
American and automotive versus financial sectors), we build on the defense 
of the Chapter 11 automotive cases that Lubben has previously developed.3 
That is, the Chrysler and GM cases did not subvert normal Chapter 11 
practice.4 Rather, we argue that the automotive cases are a good case study 
of how governments can provide money to a failing, but significant industry 
in a consistent and transparent manner. This Article is not about whether 
governments should fund failing industries. Instead, we contend that once 
such a decision has been made, the bankruptcy system is an effective way to 
implement such a decision. Further, using bankruptcy procedures to effect 
government funding of a failing industry does not distort the bankruptcy 
system. 
Our starting point is that the difference between the automotive cases 
and the other Chapter 11 cases is the identity of the debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) lender—the American and Canadian governments. As Lubben has 
already observed, while “[t]he identity of the DIP lender [was] novel, . . . 
what happened [was] routine. And the identity of the lender [was] not a 
bankruptcy issue.”5 In the automotive cases, the identity of the DIP lender 
was a question of economic reality. Obtaining DIP financing is an essential 
element of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization, as it allows debtors to 
maintain sufficient liquidity during the reorganization and obtain post-
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 1. Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 531, 531 (2009) [hereinafter No Big Deal].  
 2. Id. at 531–32.  
 3. Id. at 538. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 532–33 (citations omitted).  
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petition loans to help them emerge from bankruptcy.6 However, following 
the credit crisis, it became increasingly difficult to obtain DIP financing, as 
“[t]he usual lenders . . . [had] exited the market, presumably due to either a 
lack of liquidity or their own financial struggles.”7 As such, it was 
necessary to seek out alternative DIP lenders;8 in the case of Chrysler, and 
especially GM, where the DIP loan was the largest ever obtained by a 
debtor, the U.S. and Canadian governments filled this void. 
Part I provides an overview of the Chrysler and GM cases. Part II 
considers the criticism and commentary surrounding the use of Chapter 11 
in the automotive cases. Part III situates the Chrysler and GM cases in the 
context of the broader bailout versus bankruptcy debates. Part IV uses the 
examples of Bear Sterns, AIG, Citibank, and Lehman Brothers (Lehman) to 
suggest that the use of Chapter 11 over a bailout is supported by American 
experience beyond the automotive cases. Part V considers the bankruptcy 
versus bailout approach in the Canadian context and explores a recent 
Canadian example—the asset-backed commercial paper crisis—to illustrate 
how bankruptcy has been used over bailouts in the Canadian context. Part V 
also identifies limitations to expanding this approach across borders. 
Finally, Part VI concludes. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 11 AUTOMOTIVE CASES 
In 2009, North American automotive manufacturers Chrysler and GM 
filed Chapter 11 petitions as a result of ongoing financial difficulties that 
suddenly came to a head as a consequence of the wider economic crisis.9 
These cases involved substantial similarities, and in many respects, 
Chrysler provided a “test run” for its larger, latter counterpart, GM. For 
example, both Chrysler’s and GM’s bankruptcies involved “quick sales” 
under § 363 of Chapter 11.10 Under this section, a DIP is permitted, under 
some conditions, to sell its assets free and clear of any interest in them.11 
The benefit of a sale under § 363 is that it tends to be much faster than a 
detailed Chapter 11 plan under §§ 1123 and 1129. By providing for a faster 
sale, § 363 sales are usually the best option when dealing with ongoing 
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 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. See Kevin Krolicki & John Crawley, GM Files for Bankruptcy, Chrysler Sale Cleared, 
REUTERS, June 1, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/01/us-gm-
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 10. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2010). For a detailed, comparative discussion of quick sales, see 
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Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591, 591 (2011). 
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losses, limited lender funding commitments, and rapidly depleting assets.12 
Once a DIP chooses to dispose of its assets in a quick sale, the typical 
process involves finding an initial bidder (often known as a “stalking 
horse,” for reasons that mystify many, including the authors) and approving 
the bidding procedures.13 The overarching goal of this process is to 
maximize the value of the estate, thereby increasing creditors’ returns.14 
Although the Chrysler and GM cases followed the basic framework for 
a quick sale, they were noteworthy for their historic and economic 
importance, for the speed at which they occurred, and perhaps most 
significantly, because both corporations received substantial financing from 
the U.S. and Canadian governments.15 As one of us describes, 
In both cases, the U.S. Treasury and the governments of Canada and 
Ontario agreed to provide the automakers with DIP financing on the 
condition that a sale of each debtor’s assets occur on an expedited basis so 
as to preserve the value of the business, restore consumer confidence, and 
avoid the costs of a lengthy chapter 11 process. In both cases the purchaser 
of the assets was a newly created entity, funded by the North American 
governments. In exchange for wage cuts that brought the automakers in 
line with their foreign competitors, and the union’s promise not to strike 
for several years, the purchasers agreed to give equity stakes in the 
reorganized company to the [United Auto Workers]’s retiree health care 
trust, called the Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations. . . .16 
More specifically, in the Chrysler case,  
[I]ts two largest creditors were secured creditors owed $6.9 billion and an 
unsecured employee benefit plan, owed $10 billion. [Chrysler] also owed 
trade creditors $5.3 billion, and it had warranty and dealer obligations of 
several billion dollars.  
[To address these issues,] [t]he government created and funded a shell 
company [(New Chrysler)] that, through a § 363 sale from Chrysler, 
bought substantially all of Chrysler’s assets for $2 billion, giving the 
secured creditors a return of 29 cents on the dollar. FIAT was brought in 
to manage the new firm and was given a slice of the new company’s stock. 
New Chrysler . . . then assumed the old company’s debts to the [union] 
retirees, most dealers, and trade creditors. The $10 billion of unsecured 
claims owed to the retirees’ benefits plan were replaced with a new $4.6 
billion note as well as 55 percent of the new company’s stock.17 
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Although the majority of Chrysler’s senior lenders approved of the 
government’s plan with Fiat, certain distressed debt buyers, primarily two 
Indiana pension funds, raised several objections, including the claim that 
the quick sale was essentially a plan in disguise.18 However, the pension 
funds’ arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, which added 
that—having contractually given up their right to independent action—the 
funds also lacked standing to bring their objections.19 
As with Chrysler, GM had both secured and unsecured debt, owing 
$19.4 billion in pre-petition debt to the U.S. Treasury and billions more to a 
range of secured lenders, including a syndicate of lenders led by Citicorp 
US, Inc. ($3.9 billion), a syndicate of lenders led by JPMorgan Chase ($1.5 
billion), Export Development Bank Canada ($400 million), and Gelco 
Corporation ($125 million).20 Additionally, GM had $117 billion in 
unsecured debt to creditors such as the United Auto Workers (UAW) Trust 
(the UAW Trust).21 After GM filed for Chapter 11, $30.1 billion in DIP 
financing was given by the U.S. Treasury and $3.2 billion was provided by 
the Canadian government, with another $6 billion to be provided later.22 
In terms of the GM agreement, its structure was quite similar to the 
Chrysler agreement. As with Chrysler, a new entity was formed (New GM), 
which purchased all of the substantial operating assets of the old company 
(Old GM) and also assumed some of its key liabilities, such as those owed 
to the UAW Trust.23 In exchange, Old GM “receiv[ed] 10% of the equity in 
the reorganized company, plus warrants to purchase up to 15% more equity 
under certain conditions.”24 The U.S. and Canadian governments, who were 
owed $50 billion in combined pre- and post-petition financing, assigned 
their loans to New GM, which credit bid for the assets of Old GM.25 
In the end, “[t]he first-priority secured lenders of Old GM (other than 
the U.S. Treasury and the Canadian government) were repaid their $6 
billion in full by New GM. The unsecured lenders received . . . [the 
aforementioned 10 percent equity stake in New GM]. The shareholders of 
                                                                                                                 
 18. No Big Deal, supra note 1, at 537. This is significant, as “courts have developed rules to 
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 23. Id. at 537–38. See also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 24. No Big Deal, supra note 1, at 538. 
 25. Warburton, supra note 20, at 538. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, creditors can bid up to 
the full amount of their secured debt claim to acquire the assets to which their lien is attached in 
exchange for the cancelling of indebtedness in the amount of the bid. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2010). 
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Old GM received nothing.”26 It is worth noting that, “[a]s it did with 
Chrysler, the UAW [made] concessions to New GM on employee 
compensation and benefits and on retiree healthcare.”27 The UAW received 
common stock (with warrants to purchase more), preferred stock, and an 
additional $2.5 billion note in exchange for their compromise.28 
II. CRITICISM AND COMMENTARY ON THE AUTOMOTIVE 
CASES 
Barry Adler’s allegation, that “[t]he descent of Chrysler and [GM] into 
bankruptcy threatens the Chapter 11 reorganization process itself[,]”29 is 
representative of the bulk of the commentary on the automotive cases. 
Although Adler concedes that these cases were successful insofar as they 
“quickly removed assets from the burden of unmanageable debt amidst a 
global recession,” he adds that the “price of this achievement was 
unnecessarily high because the cases established or buttressed precedent for 
the disregard of creditor rights.”30 Essentially, Adler posits that the manner 
in which the automotive bankruptcies were carried out favored certain 
creditors, while denying the rights of others. Accordingly, Adler and other 
proponents of this perspective argue that the Chrysler and GM cases “may 
usher in a period where the threat of insolvency will increase the cost of 
capital in an economy where affordable credit is sorely needed.”31 
A number of responses can and have been put forward. First, the over-
availability of credit is partially responsible for the recent credit crisis in the 
first place.32 Accordingly, it is open to debate whether affordable credit is 
actually what this economy needs and what “affordable” should mean. The 
difference between “affordable” and “underpriced” is often difficult to 
discern. 
More importantly, although many critics believe that these cases 
involved a “precedent-setting distortion of bankruptcy priorities,”33 this is 
not necessarily the case. Rather, these cases simply reflected the standard 
U.S. regime as it has existed for at least a decade. As Edward Morrison 
argues, these cases “exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured 
creditors—especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy 
case—control over the fate of distressed firms. Because the federal 
government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM cases, it possessed 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Warburton, supra note 20, at 538.  
 27. Id. at 538. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General 
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 30. Id.  
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 32. When Fortune Frowned, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, at S3.  
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the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders.”34 Or, as one of 
us less politely explained, “[i]n the past decade lenders have learned how to 
play the chapter 11 game. . . . [W]hen I see these same institutional 
investors acting like Captain Renault, I’m skeptical.”35 
In these cases, the governments, as DIP lenders, used their power as 
lenders to force a separation of the good and bad assets of the companies.36 
Accordingly, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies did not “break new 
ground” by altering priority rules; instead, they relied on the procedures 
commonly used in Chapter 11 reorganizations.37 Whether secured lender 
domination of the Chapter 11 process is a good thing is open to debate, and 
is not limited to the automotive cases. 
In addition to the argument that the Chrysler and GM cases subverted 
traditional priority rules, critics have argued, along similar lines, that in 
these cases, bankruptcy courts failed to honor the entitlement for which 
creditors contract.38 Moreover, these dissenters also have highlighted the 
fact that in Chrysler, secured creditors received twenty-nine cents on the 
dollar, and general unsecured creditors received nothing.39 In GM, secured 
creditors were paid in full, and unsecured creditors received a partial 
payment.40 That looks a lot like the application of the absolute priority 
rule.41 
In response to the broader point, one of us has already argued that it 
essentially amounts to a “statement that the government should prefer 
investors over unions.”42 Yet, determining which creditors should be 
preferred is a matter of policy, and despite arguments that these cases 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Edward R. Morrison, Chrysler, GM and the Future of Chapter 11 (Ctr. for L. & Econ. 
Stud. at Colum., Working Paper No. 365, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
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 36. Morrison, supra note 34, at 4.  
 37. Id. at 1.  
 38. Richard A. Epstein, The Deadly Sins of the Chrysler Bankruptcy: Why Mortgage Priorities 
Matter, FORBES, May 12, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/11/chrysler-bankruptcy-mort 
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 39. See Fred N. David, Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler 
Bankruptcy and its Impact on Future Business Reorganizations, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 25, 
32 (2010). 
 40. See Eric Morath, GM Creditors Sue U.S. over $1.5 Billion Dispute, MARKETWATCH (June 
8, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/gm-creditors-sue-usover-15-billion-
dispute-2011-06-08; Linda Sandler, Jeff Green & Mike Ramsey, GM Bankruptcy Seen as Tale of 
Best, Worst of Assets, BLOOMBERG, May 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=21070001&sid=av48.BJYaJbU. 
 41. The absolute priority rule provides that creditors of a higher priority must get paid in full 
before the lower ranked creditors (or shareholders) get anything. For example, secured creditors 
are paid before unsecured creditors, who must be paid before shareholders. 11 USC  
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006). See also Case v. L.A. Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939); 
Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 42. No Big Deal, supra note 1, at 531.  
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violated the “rule of law,” “the rule of law is not violated by a policy 
disagreement.”43 
Complaints about the amount received by secured creditors under the 
quick sale are also perplexing, as thirty cents on the dollar is a relatively 
average recovery rate during a bankruptcy. As Nouriel Roubini notes, “in 
the past seven months, completed [Credit Default Swap] . . . auctions 
resulted in a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar for loans and about 15 
cents on the dollar for bonds,”44 despite better results in the past. 
Similarly, critics of the Chrysler and GM Chapter 11 cases underscore 
the fact that shareholders received nothing for their equity positions.45 Yet, 
much like the recovery rate of thirty cents on the dollar for secured 
creditors, this too is not unusual. Claims by shareholders for the return of 
equity do not rank as high as the claims of creditors in bankruptcy.46 
Consequently, under bankruptcy law, shareholders do not recover anything 
unless the claims of all creditors are satisfied.47 As such, one is curious why 
critics would question these particular elements of the Chrysler and GM 
cases. 
In addition to the general criticisms outlined above, academics also took 
issue with specific elements of the Chrysler and GM cases. For example, 
testifying before Congress, Douglas Baird claimed that the bidding 
procedures approved by the courts in the Chrysler and GM quick sales 
“amounted to an impermissible, stealth reorganization plan because bidders 
were required to treat the unions in the same manner as the initial, 
government-sponsored bidder.”48 This argument is significant insofar as 
courts have developed rules to curb the imposition of reorganization plans 
under the § 363 sales process.49 A ready response to this argument, 
however, has already been made that in light of the dearth of alternative 
bidders in the automotive cases, bidding procedures are entirely irrelevant.50 
Specifically, given the state of credit markets, “those who take for granted 
the existence of unknown or theoretical bidders have some obligation to 
                                                                                                                 
 43.  Id.  
 44. Nouriel Roubini, The Impact of Chrysler’s Bankruptcy: Lessons for GM—and for the Rest 
of Us, FORBES, May 5, 2009, http://forbeslife.nl/2009/05/06/chrysler-gm-fiat-bankruptcy-opin 
ions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html. 
 45. David, supra note 39, at 32.  
 46. Allen v. Geneva Steel Co. (In re Geneva Steel Co.), 281 F.3d 1173, 1180 n.4 (10th Cir. 
2002); see also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988); Grp. of Inst. 
Investors v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 565–66 (1943). 
 47. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005). See Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 140.1. Following the 2009 amendments, a creditor is not 
entitled to a dividend in respect of an equity claim until all claims that are not equity clams have 
been satisfied.  
 48. No Big Deal, supra note 1, at 532. 
 49. Id. at 533.  
 50. Id. at 532. 
86 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
explain how such a bidder would have bought GM, a company with $27 
billion of secured debt.”51 
As mentioned above, in an economic climate where DIP financing is 
scarce, it bears questioning whether there were truly any better options for 
GM and Chrysler. If there were better options, one can easily surmise that 
the governments of the United States and Canada would have happily 
washed their hands of the entire matter. 
III. THE BANKRUPTCY VERSUS BAILOUT DEBATE 
Following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis and the unveiling of the 
U.S. Treasury’s 2008 bailout plan, there has been considerable debate in the 
United States as to whether bankruptcy or bailouts produce more desirable 
results for failing companies, and for the economy as a whole. In particular, 
the Federal Reserve Board’s (the Fed) and the U.S. Treasury’s differing 
treatment of Bear Sterns, which was bailed out, Lehman, which went 
bankrupt, and then AIG, which was also bailed out, are at the forefront of 
this discussion. These cases are compared and discussed in more detail in 
the next section, illustrating that our argument for bankruptcy over bailout 
extends beyond the automotive cases. 
In 2008, the U.S. government put forth a bailout plan with the dual 
purpose of saving the banks while also encouraging them to lend, thus 
saving the broader economy.52 Among the justifications offered was the fact 
that “as of early September 2008, major banks were facing imminent failure 
because their mortgage-backed assets had declined rapidly in value.”53 
These banks were essentially deemed “too big to fail,” especially when 
failures were apt to come in bunches. Implicit in this argument is the belief 
that failing—or going bankrupt—in this case, would be catastrophic. 
Accordingly, the central “benefit” of a bailout was that it was not 
bankruptcy. 
Indeed, one of the key arguments often advanced in favor of bailouts is 
the ability to sidestep “supposedly severe consequences that would follow” 
from a bankruptcy.54 Proponents of this approach focus on two particular 
“shortcomings” of bankruptcy. First, critics emphasize the impact of 
bankruptcy “on the value of the distressed firm itself. Bankruptcy, the 
reasoning goes, would severely dissipate the value of the firm’s assets.”55 
These concerns are characterized as “firm-specific risks.”56 Second, critics 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 52. Jeffrey A. Miron, Bailout or Bankruptcy?, 29 CATO J. 1, 11 (Winter 2009), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n1/cj29n1-1.pdf.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 470 
(2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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of bankruptcy cite the negative consequences of a bankruptcy filing outside 
the firm, as “bankruptcy filing directly affects the firm’s contractual 
counterparties, some of whom (such as lenders and derivative 
counterparties) have direct claims on the firm, while others hold contracts 
whose value is tied to the distressed firm.”57 The premise of this argument 
is that a bankruptcy filing has “spillover effects,” such that the bankruptcy 
of one firm will adversely affect several others, and possibly the economy 
as a whole.58 
In response, proponents of the bankruptcy process posit that there are 
significant drawbacks to relying on bailouts. For example, Kenneth Ayotte 
and David Skeel characterize bailouts as “ad-hoc” and “last minute rescue 
efforts.”59 They argue: 
The rescue loan approach favored in the financial crisis increased 
uncertainty, increased the costs of moral hazard, and dampened the 
incentive of private actors to resolve distress before a desperate “day of 
reckoning” arose. These forces created substantial costs, over and above 
the direct and substantial cost to the taxpayer of rescue funding.60 
Ayotte and Skeel also tackle the specific two-pronged argument of 
bailout enthusiasts. With respect to the issue of firm-specific risks, they 
state that the “firm-specific risks of Chapter 11 are overstated,”61 adding 
that “the law gives distressed firms several advantages in bankruptcy that 
are unavailable outside of bankruptcy. These advantages help preserve firm 
value, allocate control rights to residual claimants, and do a more effective 
job of handling moral hazard concerns than taxpayer-funded rescue loans 
on the eve of bankruptcy.”62Ayotte and Skeel acknowledge that there is no 
perfect solution; when a firm is failing, someone always loses. They 
contend: 
The distress of financial firms thus poses an inescapable choice: regulators 
must either allow counterparties to take losses, and thus confront the 
possibility of systemic effects, or they must use taxpayer money to prevent 
the losses from being realized. Bankruptcy has proven to be an adequate 
mechanism for handling the former choice, and it is flexible enough to 
accommodate the latter.63 
With respect to the alleged systemic risks of bankruptcy, it is 
questionable whether they are restricted to bankruptcy proceedings alone. 
Indeed, “[s]ome of these systemic costs . . . would arise in any procedure 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 471.  
 58. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010). 
 59. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 54, at 471.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 471–72. 
 63. Id. at 472 (citations omitted). 
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that forces counterparties to bear losses when there are not enough assets to 
satisfy all counterparty claims.”64 Jeffrey Miron concurs, claiming that 
“U.S. policymakers should have allowed the standard process of bankruptcy 
to operate.”65 Miron contends that although bankruptcy “would not have 
avoided all [the] costs of the crisis . . . it would plausibly have moderated 
those costs relative to a bailout. Even more, the bankruptcy approach would 
have reduced rather than enhanced the likelihood of future crises.”66 
Additionally, with respect to systemic risks, it is difficult to determine 
whether the “crisis of confidence” that occurs when a large firm goes 
bankrupt is a result of the actual bankruptcy, or the fact that a major 
business is in financial distress.67 Accordingly, the contention that filing for 
bankruptcy, in and of itself, initiates some kind economic domino effect 
remains to be proven. 
Moreover, for some, bankruptcy is not merely the “lesser of two evils”; 
rather, it is a beneficial choice. For example, Miron notes that “[f]ailure is 
an essential aspect of capitalism. It provides information about good and 
bad investments, and it releases resources from bad projects to more 
productive ones.”68 
IV. BEAR STERNS, AIG, AND CITIBANK VERSUS LEHMAN  
While in the automotive context the American government consistently 
utilized the Bankruptcy Code, its choice of process with respect to financial 
institutions can be charitably described as erratic.69 During the financial 
crisis, three investment firms were known to have faced financial distress, 
and the U.S. government chose to resolve the distress first by a bailout, then 
by a Chapter 11 case, and finally, through another bailout. Moreover, it is 
now apparent that Citibank was in more trouble than previously 
acknowledged, and it too was bailed out during the crisis, although with an 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. Miron, supra note 52, at 2 (noting that the term bankruptcy indicates “any official 
reorganization or liquidation procedure”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk & Chapter 11, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 437 (2009) 
[hereinafter Systemic Risk & Chapter 11]. 
 68. Miron, supra note 52, at 12. 
 69. This was also the finding of the report released by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC) on January 27, 2011. The FCIC concluded that “the government was ill prepared for the 
crisis and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.” 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION xxi (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf. We speak here of nonbank financial institutions. In 
both the United States and Canada, banks are subject to a separate insolvency system. See 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Bank Bankruptcy in Canada: A Comparative Perspective, 25 BANKING & 
FIN. L. REV. 59 (2009). 
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even lesser degree of transparency than the already opaque publicly 
acknowledged bailouts.70 
Bear Stearns, the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank, was founded in 
1923 and had managed to survive shocks from the Great Depression 
through the September 11th attacks.71 However, it ran with the flock when 
it decided to place a hefty, leveraged bet on the weak end of the U.S. 
mortgage market.72 
Specifically, in summer 2007, Bear Stearns Asset Management, a hedge 
fund subsidiary of Bear Sterns, “reported that its Bear Stearns High-Grade 
Structured Credit Fund had lost more than 90% of its value, while the Bear 
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund had lost 
virtually all of its investor capital.”73 At one point, the “Structured Credit 
Fund had around $1 billion, while the Enhanced Leveraged Fund, which 
was less than a year old, had nearly $600 million in investor capital.”74 The 
two funds were heavily invested in mortgage-backed securities, both 
directly and via synthetic structures that used derivatives to replicate the 
effects of mortgage-backed loans.75 After this announcement, the next year 
saw Bear Stearns disclose similar losses in its own trading, and the 
development of a general run on Bear Sterns began, causing investors in the 
two funds to become increasingly disgruntled.76 The New York Federal 
Reserve Bank (the N.Y. Fed) decided to loan money to support the 
purchase of Bear Sterns by JPMorgan Chase (Chase).77 Additionally, the 
N.Y. Fed agreed to take over certain risky assets that Chase refused to 
purchase; and these assets eventually found a home in an LLC owned by 
the N.Y. Fed.78 
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Despite these heavy investments by the N.Y. Fed, Bear Sterns 
shareholders received $10 per share from Chase.79 In short, Bear Sterns’ 
creditors were spared from incurring any losses and its shareholders likely 
received $10 per share more than they would have in a Chapter 11 case. 
If the U.S. government thought that saving this one bank had ended the 
problem, they were quickly disabused of that notion as the markets 
increasingly reflected the belief that Lehman was next. At the same time, 
although this fact was apparently less widely understood, both AIG and 
Citibank were heading toward the precipice as Bear Sterns’ collapse drove 
down the value of real estate related assets.80 
Seeing that Bear Sterns was not the last bank that would fail, and facing 
the possibility that the U.S. government would eventually have to bail out 
multiple financial institutions, the government urged the financial industry 
to formulate a plan to save Lehman. When that effort failed, Lehman 
decided to file a bankruptcy petition. 
Unfortunately, it seems that neither banking regulators nor Lehman 
management appreciated that filing a large corporate bankruptcy case 
involves a good deal of advanced planning. Instead, both parties treated the 
matter more like a homeowner seeking to use bankruptcy on the day of the 
foreclosure sale: Lehman’s bankruptcy counsel was only alerted on the day 
of the proposed filing. This has sometimes led banking regulators and 
others to draw faulty conclusions from the Lehman case—essentially 
arguing that Lehman shows that Chapter 11 is unsuitable for financial 
institutions. 
Nonetheless, with the aid of continued lending from the Fed to 
Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman was able to quickly sell its 
assets to Barclays. Thus, along with the automotive cases, Lehman 
represents the third significant use of § 363 during the financial crisis. 
Unlike the financial firm bailouts that came before and after it, Lehman’s 
resolution would take place in a courtroom, with a transcript. 
Lehman stands most in contrast to AIG, which failed almost 
immediately after Lehman.81 Indeed, given the parallel tracks the two 
companies were on in the fall of 2008, it is somewhat surprising that federal 
regulators did not anticipate the effects that the failure of Lehman would 
have on AIG.82 
The Fed first bailed out AIG in September 2008 with an $85 billion 
loan, part of a total of $150 billion lent to the company.83 The N.Y. Fed also 
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led a controversial plan in late 2008 to help AIG cancel over $50 billion in 
credit derivative swap contracts with U.S. and European banks by paying 
the banks in full for their contracts with AIG.84 
In the latter instance, both the Fed and the U.S. Treasury resisted efforts 
by reporters to discover who these banks were.85 Ultimately, the 
information was released, and revealed that the Fed had not only saved 
several large American financial institutions from distress, but also key 
German and French financial institutions.86 The latter information 
demonstrated how the Fed had taken on the role of saving not just the U.S. 
economy, but also that of saving most of the larger Western economic 
system. 
Then, in November 2008, Citibank neared its own failure, even after it 
had already taken $25 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
funds from the U.S. Treasury to shore up its capital.87 Ultimately, Citibank 
would require $45 billion in bailout funds and a ten-year government-
backed insurance policy on more than $300 billion of mortgages and other 
related securities before it stabilized.88 The extent to which Citibank was 
nearly taken over by the government and the full extent of its problems 
were not widely understood until more than two years later.89 
Notably, in all three of the bailouts, shareholders in the failed financial 
institutions managed to retain their stakes in the companies, avoiding the 
need to take immediate losses and participating in a government-funded 
revitalization of the financial institutions.90 Bondholders in these companies 
were spared any losses whatsoever.91 This stands in stark contrast to 
Lehman, where shareholders were apt to be wiped out and bondholders 
would suffer significant losses. 
More broadly, and as noted earlier, Lehman offers a degree of 
transparency, resulting from the use of the traditional bankruptcy system, 
which was totally lacking in the other financial institution cases. The 
opacity of the bailouts contributed to the growth of conspiracy theories 
during the crisis, including claims that Goldman Sachs was favored by 
government officials and that TARP recipients were pressured to support 
administrative policy, including the automotive bankruptcy cases. Many of 
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these conspiracy theories were embraced by academics and others, and have 
buttressed a general claim of “lawlessness.” Moreover, while Lehman was 
able to proceed according to previously established rules set forth in the 
Bankruptcy Code and established by prior Chapter 11 cases, the bailouts 
contributed to the feeling that the government was acting in an arbitrary and 
ill-considered manner with regard to distressed financial institutions. 
V. BANKRUPTCY VERSUS BAILOUT IN CANADA: THE ASSET-
BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER CRISIS 
In this section, we further develop our thesis that the automotive cases 
are a good case study for the effective use of bankruptcy over bailout. We 
have argued that the comparison of the Lehman bankruptcy and the Bear 
Sterns and AIG bailouts illustrates that our thesis extends beyond the 
automotive sector. Here, we argue that a comparable, but not identical, 
regime in Canada further demonstrates that our thesis may also extend 
across borders where the bankruptcy system is transparent and clear. 
As we have shown elsewhere, the Canadian Companies Creditors 
Arrangements Act (CCAA)92 allows a debtor to make use of a quick sale 
procedure similar to the Chapter 11 procedure.93 In Canada, however, the 
debtor has less ability to “cleanse” assets through the sale process. 
Particularly with regard to employee claims, a pre-plan sale under the 
CCAA is not apt to be quite as “free and clear” as its American counterpart. 
The jurisdictions also differ on the point at which the reorganization 
procedures—and the sale process—can be invoked. Canada, like most other 
jurisdictions, has an insolvency prerequisite for commencing a proceeding, 
whereas Chapter 11 does not.94 And the Canadian sale process is tied to the 
oversight of cases by the monitor: without the monitor’s consent, it is 
unlikely that a Canadian court would approve a pre-plan asset sale.95 In the 
United States, on the other hand, there is no such position. Accordingly, a 
debtor can seek almost immediate approval of a sale upon filing. Finally, 
there remains some doubt and conflicting case law in Canada about the use 
of the CCAA in circumstances that amount to liquidation, particularly 
following an asset sale. In the United States, it is quite clear that Chapter 11 
can be used for liquidation.96 
We have shown that questions of speed and certainty mark the biggest 
difference between these two jurisdictions, as the CCAA is more than 
sufficiently flexible to account for simple procedural differences. It is likely 
that this combination of factors—speed and certainty—is the most plausible 
explanation for the failure to use the CCAA in the automotive cases. It is 
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also possible, however, that the Canadian governmental actors involved in 
the automotive cases preferred to act in the U.S. forum, which may have 
been less transparent to a Canadian observer and thus, less likely to result in 
political consequences at home. 
Setting aside the question of the advantages and disadvantages of 
Canada’s slower moving, and at times less transparent, quick sale process 
under the CCAA, the CCAA has been used to effect a bailout of an 
industry—the asset-backed commercial paper industry—as was done in 
Lehman and the automotive cases. While the government clearly had a role 
in the CCAA process, this example is not identical to the American cases as 
it is unclear what was provided by the way of funding. 
Within the recent credit crisis, the asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) stood out as one of the key issues in Canada. Simply put, ABCP is 
a short-term form of investment that is asset-backed. It is a secured debt 
obligation “issued by a limited purpose trust . . . to fund [the] purchases of 
assets that back-up the ABCP and generate cash flow.”97 In the United 
States, ABCP were commonly referred to as “conduits,” and were widely 
used before the financial crisis to move assets off a financial institution’s 
balance sheet.98 As such, ABCP, or conduit structures were primarily 
motivated by regulatory arbitrage. 
According to Jay Hoffman and Jeffrey Carhart of Miller Thomson LLP, 
a leading Canadian corporate law firm, the assets underlying Canadian 
ABCP are traditionally “made-up of mortgages and various types of 
consumer loans and receivables, but many of the trusts currently hold a 
significant portion of their assets in the form of credit default swaps, 
collateralized debt obligations and other leveraged derivatives 
instruments.”99 The repayment of maturing ABCP is accomplished via the 
cash  
generated by an issuer trust’s underlying asset portfolio and the issuance 
of new ABCP. In addition, to provide ABCP trusts with a back-up source 
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of liquidity, the trust generally arranges for liquidity support facilities that, 
subject to satisfying certain conditions, may be drawn by the issuer on the 
occurrence of a ‘market disruption’ . . . .100  
In Canada, the ABCP market is divided in two. On the one hand, there is 
ABCP issued by trusts and managed by Schedule I banks, which are 
essentially domestic banks authorized under Canada’s Bank Act to accept 
deposits;101 on the other, there is ABCP issued by trusts which are not 
sponsored or managed by banks.102 
In 2007, on the heels of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United 
States, a liquidity crisis began to threaten the ABCP market in Canada.103 
This crisis was fuelled by investors’ loss of confidence following the news 
of defaults on sub-prime mortgages and placed Canadian financial markets 
at risk.104 Additionally, the ABCP crisis was the result of a timing 
mismatch; while ABCP is a short-term investment, the assets backing it 
tended to be long-term assets (e.g., mortgages and credit card receivables). 
As such, there was a timing issue between the cash they generated and the 
funds needed to repay the maturing notes.105 During the credit crisis, many 
investors stopped buying ABCP and rolling over their notes. Instead, they 
sought to redeem them. Yet, as a result of the timing mismatch, most funds 
were unable to pay holders of maturing ABCP, which created a liquidity 
crisis for holders.106 In short, something similar to a bank failure developed 
at the level of the ABCP trusts. Compounding these problems was the total 
lack of transparency that characterized the ABCP market: Noteholders 
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rarely had any idea about the specific assets supporting their notes, and this 
further added to investors’ lack of confidence.107 
As a result of the impending crisis, in August 2007, a group of financial 
institutions involved in the Canadian ABCP market met to form what is 
known as the Montreal Proposal. Under this agreement, 
these institutions (and other holders who later signed on) agreed to a 60 
day standstill period during which each party agreed that it would roll-
over its non-bank sponsored ABCP on or following its maturity date and 
would not take any action that would precipitate an event of default under 
the trust indenture governing the ABCP. This agreement include[d] a 
pledge by asset providers to refrain from making any collateral calls on 
assets held by the trusts and a pledge by trust sponsors to refrain from 
calling on any liquidity provider who signed on to the proposal to fund 
under liquidity facilities. In addition, the participants in the Montreal 
Proposal agreed in principal to a proposal that would see ABCP eventually 
converted to rated floating-rate notes with maturities matching the 
maturities of the underlying assets.108 
Essentially, the Montreal Proposal was a “standstill” agreement and 
represented the first of many plans made by key Canadian participants to 
freeze the $32 billion ABCP market in an attempt to restructure it.109 
Following the Montreal Proposal, an investor committee, chaired by 
Purdy Crawford, was formed to oversee the restructuring of the ABCP 
market.110 This committee became known as the Pan-Canadian Investors 
Committee, or the Crawford Committee. Although their plan was “highly 
complex and involve[d] many parties,”111 its essence was this: to “convert 
the [n]oteholders’ paper—which has been frozen and therefore effectively 
worthless for many months—into new, long-term notes that would trade 
freely, but with a discounted face value.”112 In an attempt to deal with the 
transparency issues that precipitated the crisis in the first place, investors 
would be informed about the assets supporting their notes.113 The plan also 
aimed to “address[] the timing mismatch between the notes and the 
[underlying] assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates 
on the new notes. Further, the [p]lan adjusts some of the underlying credit 
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default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default . . . .”114 
Additionally, in order to make the notes more secure, the plan would pool 
the majority of assets underlying ABCP into two master vehicles.115 
The plan also included third-party releases from any liability associated 
with the ABCP. Thus, noteholders would have to give up their claims, 
which were mostly tort claims alleging negligence, misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, and 
acting in conflict of interest.116 Specifically, the plan called for “the release 
of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, 
Liquidity Providers, and other market participants – in Crawford’s words, 
‘virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market’ – from any 
liability associated with ABCP . . . .”117 These releases were necessary to 
compensate participants for concessions made to facilitate the plan, which 
included asset providers assuming an increased risk in their credit default 
swap contracts, disclosing certain proprietary information in relation to the 
assets, and providing below-cost financing for margin funding facilities 
designed to make the notes more secure. It also required sponsors to give up 
their existing contracts, banks to provide below-cost financing for the 
margin funding facility, and other parties to make various contributions to 
the plan.118 Initially, there were concerns over the releases in the plan being 
too broad; as such, a “fraud carve-out” was added to exclude certain fraud 
claims from the plan’s releases.119 
Yet, despite the seemingly balanced approach taken in the plan, a small 
group of noteholders (the Dissenting Noteholders) opposed the plan, 
preferring instead to retain the option of suing those who had sold them the 
ABCP.120 Specifically, the Dissident Noteholders felt that their chances of 
receiving value under the plan were not sufficient to surrender their right to 
litigate.121 Moreover, the Dissenting Noteholders took issue with the 
releases granted under the plan. In particular, the Dissenting Noteholders 
questioned whether the court could sanction a plan that calls for creditors to 
provide releases to third parties who are in fact solvent and not actually 
creditors of the debtor company.122 
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Nevertheless, at trial, Justice Campbell, of the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice, held that the releases sought under the Plan of Arrangement were 
fair and reasonable.123 In attempting to assess the fairness and 
reasonableness of the plan—post-fraud carve out—Justice Campbell posed 
seven broad questions in order to reach a decision: 
1. Are the parties to be released necessary and essential to the 
restructuring of the debtor? 
2. Are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of 
the Plan and necessary for it? 
3. Can the Court be satisfied that without the releases the Plan 
cannot succeed? 
4. Are the parties who will have claims against them released 
contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan? 
5. Is the Plan one that will benefit not only the debtor but creditor 
Noteholders generally? 
6. Have the voting creditors approved the Plan with knowledge of 
the nature and effect of the releases? 
7. Is the Court satisfied that in the circumstances the releases [were] 
fair and reasonable in the sense that they were not overly broad 
and not offensive to public policy?124 
Ultimately, in holding that the plan—including the third-party 
releases—was fair and reasonable,125 Justice Campbell dismissed the claims 
of the Dissenting Noteholders, characterizing their desire to defeat the plan 
as a “tyranny by the minority.”126 Moreover, he also stressed the big picture 
thrust of his decision, stating that the ABCP crisis was “a unique situation 
in which it [was] necessary to look at larger issues than those affecting 
those who feel strongly that personal redress should predominate.”127 
This decision was then appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 
where the court was required to determine the permissible scope of a 
restructuring under the CCAA.128 Furthermore, on appeal, the dissenting 
creditors proposed that if the court can indeed sanction such a plan, then the 
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applications (i.e., trial) judge erred in holding that this particular plan was 
fair and reasonable.129 
In response to the dissenting creditors’ argument that the CCAA does 
not permit releases such as those included in the plan, the court noted that 
the CCAA is skeletal and flexible; as such, courts must play a key role in 
filling in the gaps in the scheme.130 The Court of Appeal for Ontario added 
that “[a]n interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader 
socioeconomic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the application 
judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the 
Canadian ABCP market itself.”131 Accordingly, in order to facilitate the 
broader socioeconomic purposes underlying the CCAA, the court 
established that third-party releases are indeed permissible where they are 
reasonably connected to the restructuring at hand. Justice Blair summarized 
this rule: 
The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the 
resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament 
wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that 
could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators 
restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those 
deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and 
flexible concepts of a “compromise” and “arrangement.”132 
Ultimately, the court saw no reason why a release in favor of a third-
party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and 
reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring, cannot fall within this 
framework.133 The court also held that the releases were reasonably justified 
as part of the compromise between the debtors and creditors, as the plan 
could not succeed without them, and the parties being released from 
liability made significant contributions to the plan. 
With respect to the opposing creditors’ argument that the trial judge 
erred in finding that the plan was fair and reasonable, the Court of Appeal 
for Ontario disagreed. Here, the court refused to go against the trial judge’s 
decision, since he was aware of the merits of all the arguments and 
negotiated the compromise of the fraud carve-out. The court noted that the 
trial judge “was alive to the merits of the appellants’ submissions . . . . 
Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater 
benefit of the Noteholders as a whole . . . . It was his call to make.”134 
Finally, in rendering his decision for the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 
Justice Blair stressed the importance of this compromise to the ABCP 
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market as a whole. Situating this case within the broader context of 
restructuring proceedings, Justice Blair posited: 
In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. 
To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can 
always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and 
that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further 
financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have 
observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve “a 
balancing of prejudices,” inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in 
some fashion.135 
Interestingly, unlike the American critique of the automotive cases, 
which focused on the allegation that the Chapter 11 process was subverted, 
the Canadian response, having been largely played out in the media rather 
than in the academy, did not focus on the distortion of the CCAA process. 
Rather, there was a sense that because the CCAA does not provide enough 
transparency, the plan and further actions taken in response to the ABCP 
crisis constituted a “bailout.” For example, Terry Chandler, CEO of 
Redcorp. Ventures Ltd. and a holder of notes required to vote on the plan, 
was critical of the plan, citing a lack of transparency as to how the plan 
would unfold and a lack of information on which to make an informed 
decision.136 Similarly, in the same article, Peter Brown, Chairman and 
Founder of Canaccord Capital Group, claimed that “some big investment 
firms sold ABCP in July [2007] knowing that some issuers were facing 
challenges. In an interview, Mr. Brown said that [relevant] information was 
not available to the general market.”137 
In a 2007 editorial entitled “TD May Join ABCP Bailout,” the 
Financial Post outlined the ABCP “bailout,” in which the banks, not the 
taxpayers (in theory), were to be the ones doing the bailing. The article 
noted: 
The banks operate in a highly regulated environment and one of the 
regulators -- the Bank of Canada-- wants the problem solved. And it wants 
help from the banks, the institutions that sold most of the ABCP and 
which, in some cases, refused to provide back-up liquidity agreements. 
And David Dodge, governor of the Bank of Canada, wants help from all 
of them, whether they were directly involved or not. And the central bank 
has the ultimate power, as well as the power to use moral suasion with a 
message along these lines: Solving the ABCP problem is in the public 
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interest, certainly in the interests of the functioning of the financial 
markets, and all participants are expected to do their share . . . .138 
However, in a 2008 Reuters article, the Bank of Canada defended itself 
against allegations of bailing out the ABCP market with David Dodge 
successor Mark Carney asserting that the Bank of Canada never considered 
using public funds to bail out the country’s $35 billion non-ABCP 
market.139 
Outlining why public funds would not be used to bail out the ABCP 
market, Carney stated that financial market participants who “took [ABCP], 
. . . [were] sophisticated . . . . Th[is] is not the place to put taxpayers’ dollars 
or the balance sheet of the Bank of Canada.”140 Rather than bail out the 
industry, Carney insists that the Bank of Canada was “involved in this 
situation in a very light-touch way” in order to solve the “huge coordination 
problem” between the market participants involved.141 
Despite the confusion as to whether a “bailout” occurred as a result of 
the ABCP crisis, a 2009 article by Miller Thomson’s Hoffman and Carhart 
confirms that government funding played a role in recent enhancements to 
the plan. Specifically, they refer to a moratorium period of eighteen months 
following the plan’s implementation. During this period, collateral calls on 
certain credit default swaps were forbidden, and “an additional $3.45 billion 
senior ranking ‘back stop’ margin funding facility [was] to be provided by a 
combination of Canadian governments . . . available to be used for a period 
of one month following the expiry of the Moratorium Period if the other 
margin facilities [were] exhausted.”142 Further, despite the opposition and 
confusion that often accompanies allegations of a bailout, many 
academics—both domestically and abroad—have lauded the overarching 
solution achieved during the ABCP crisis. Indeed, Canada’s ABCP 
restructuring “has been hailed as a unique, successful, private restructuring 
in response” to the credit and sub-prime mortgage crises.143 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began by setting aside notions that governments always act 
unfairly, whether it makes sense to save an industry at all, and by discussing 
the causes of the financial failure of the automotive and financial industries. 
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With that, we focused on the point where a government has decided to 
intervene, and the question of how bankruptcy as bailout fares as compared 
to other bailout options. 
Our review of the Chapter 11 automotive cases offers a case study on 
the effective use of bankruptcy as an alternative to a government bailout. 
Our thesis is fleshed out by our comparison of the Lehman and Bear Sterns 
cases. However, the Canadian experience suggests that a country’s 
bankruptcy reorganization system may only be used as an effective 
alternative to bailout where the process is transparent and clear. 
That is, while both the United States and Canada have highly developed 
reorganization systems, in the particular context of a government-funded 
bailout, the extra transparency associated with Chapter 11 is an additional 
asset. By comparison, the Canadian ACBP experience, played out through 
the CCAA, illustrates that bankruptcy is only a better option when the 
trade-offs between various stakeholders are made clear. Where there 
continues to be ambiguity about the nature of government intervention and 
how various stakeholders will make out, bankruptcy as bailout is a less 
effective option. Only with transparency can a bankruptcy-bailout 
mechanism hope to achieve political legitimacy. 
